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Patrick Hamilton
Patrick Hamilton was born 22 years ago in San Jose,
California, but has lived all but three years of his life in Oregon.
He graduated in the spring of 1995 from Portland State
University with degrees in English Literature and Psychology.
His current plans include getting into graduate school, where he
plans to study clinical psychology and work toward a PhD.
Burrhus Frederic Skinner was born on March 20, 1904 in
Susquehanna, Pennsylvania. Skinner graduated from
Hamilton College with degree in English literature, but was
unable to achieve his goal of becoming a writer. Instead, he
enrolled in the graduate psychology program at Harvard in
1928 and by 1931 had earned his doctorate. Among Skinner's
works on behaviorism are Verbal Behavior, Science and Human
Behavior, and About Behaviorism, as well as a number of journal articles. His works also include the utopian novel Walden
Two and Beyond Freedom and Dignity, dealing with the possibilities of cultural engineering. B. F. Skinner died on August
18, 1990, ten days after receiving the AP1\s Lifetime
Contribution to Psychology Award. l
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1. Biographical infromation on Skinner taken from B. R Hergenhahn, An
Introduction to tht History of Psychology, Second Edition, Wadsworth, Inc.,

1992.

Structuring Skinner:
Argument, Structure, and Metaphor in

verbal Behavior
Scholarship uses argument, and argument uses rhetoric. The
"rhetoric" is not mere ornament or manipulation or trickery. It is
rhetoric in the ancient sense of persuasive discourse. In matters from
mathematical proof to literary criticism, scholars write rhetorically.
Only occasionally do they reflect on that fact. The most common
occasion is the manifesto, which seeks to expose the rhetoric of an
earlier line of scholarship, demonstrating how the tone, figures of
speech, and other devices of style to be discarded have lied or misled us. Yet even writers attacking an earlier rhetoric customarily
pay no attention to their own. Modern scholars usually deny their
rhetoric. Wearing masks of scientific methodology first donned in
the seventeenth century, they have forgotten about the rhetorical
faces underneath. Their simple repetition of official rhetoric
against rhetoric serves mainly to dampen anxieties about how
things really happen in the lab or library. Of late, the propaganda
of governments and advenising agencies has devalued rhetoric still
more.
Since the 1950s, however, and especially in the last few years,
rhetoric has revived. Literary critics, theorists of communication,
and teachers of public speaking never wholly abandoned Cicero,
Quintilian, and company. Now the rhetorically minded seem prescient in their steadfastness, for the masks of methodology are wearing thin. Many people grow weary of claims that experimental technique, documentary interpretation, or regression analysis can avoid
"subjectivity." Many scholars doubt that science opposes or replaces

an, that "ought" ought not be derived from "is," or that any method
ensures unproblematical results. Thus scientists and humanists alike
appear again in the classical guise of rhetors: good people skilled at

67

persuasion and the inquiry neede4 to support it. (Nelson, Megill, &
McCloskey, 3-4)

This quotation sums up the basic philosophy behind the
rhetoric of inquiry. It is an effort to demonstrate how the various
disciplines, in putting' forth their theories, interpretations and
ideas, are engaging in a rhetorical discourse, and that the ideas
put forth, as well as their acceptance or unacceptance, depends
as much on the schol~s' persuasive abilities as much as upon the
ideas being put forth.
What the rhetoric of inquiry deals with is the rhetoric, the
metaphors, structures, arid arguments that constantly occur
within and between various disciplines. A field that they particularly single out is social science, including psychology:
Rhetoric of inquiry is especially valuable for the human sciences, the
systematic studies of human kind. Rhetoric is generally recognized
as part of the humanities. Its renaissance started there, and it promises important revisions at home. But the social sciences have less
awareness of rhetoric than do the humanities, and would benefit
more from increased rhetorical self-consciousness. The humanities
already regard human acts and products as events for understanding,
criticism, and celebration; the social sciences now regard them as
objects for explanation, prediction, and control. The role of rhetoric
has been played down in the humanities;but it has been downright
ignored in the social sciences. In consequence, the social sciences
float in warm seas of unexamined rhetoric. (Nelson, Megill, &
McCloskey, 15-16)

This need for rhetorical analysis and discussion within the social
scienceS applies directly to the field of psychology. The attempt
to make the fidd of psychology into more and more of a "science," a move in which the physical sciences serve as a template
of "true science," has led to a buying into of science's own
68

rhetoric, which is the rhetoric of explanation, prediction, and
control. In his article "Turning Psychology on Itsdf: The
Rhetoric of Psychology and the Psychology of Rhetoric," Donal
E. Carlston pointed to this fact:
... Scientific metaphors are useful because they can aid interpretation, recall, and generalization of complex factS. But they are also
hazardous, because they can obscure alternative interpretations and
encourage selective memory, usually for facts that support the
accepted metaphor. Such a metaphor may also lead scientists to
assume, without evidence, that certain things are true because the
metaphor implies that they should be true.
Psychology provides innumerable examples of metaphorical reasoning, from Freud's Oedipal analogy for childhood sexuality to electrical models of human memory. Social psychologists equate resistance to persuasion with medical inoculation, interpersonal relations
with economic processes, human memory with laundry bins, behavioral expectations with cartoon strips, impression processes with linear regression, personal space with territoriality, and attribution
processes with analysis of variance. (Carlston, 153)

Carlston points out how science has becomes a metaphor in that
the practice of science is a particular way of approaching or
structuring a subject matter. He also points out that science, far
from being devoid of metaphor, creates metaphors of its own,
such as those he lists from psychology.
One psychologist in particular who demonstrates the use of
science as a metaphor for understanding human behavior is B. F.
Skinner. In his text Verbal Behavior, Skinner attempts to apply
the methods of science to a process hitherto unstudied by science: language and human verbal behavior. In doing so, Skinner
makes science into a metaphor for structuring verbal behavior,
and Skinner creates structures for language that are metaphori69

cally based. At the same time, Skinner denies and restricts the
use of metaphor to understand verbal behavior. As a result of
this, Skinner also engages in a running argument, as he places his
application of scientific methodology to the study of verbal
behavior in a context where it is in opposition to all other previous efforts to explain this behavior, efforts he sees as metaphorically based. This analysis of Skinner's Verbal Behavior will examine the argument and discourse that Skinner engages in
throughout this text with these other approaches, as well as
examine Skinner's conception of science and how he uses it as an
approach to the study and structuring of human verbal behavior.
In another of Skinner's works, Science and Human Behavior,
he puts forth his own idea of what science is and what its objectives are:
Science is more than the mere description of events as they occur. It
is an attempt to discover order, to show that certain events stand in
lawful relations to other events. No practical technology can be
based upon science until such relations have been discovered. But
order is not only a possible end product; it is a working assumption
which must be adopted at the very start. We cannot apply the methods of science to a subject matter which is assumed to move about
capriciously. Science not only describes, it predicts. It deals not only
with the past but with the future. Nor is prediction the last word: to
the extent that relevant conditions can be altered, or otherwise controlled, the future can be controlled. If we are to use the methods of
science in the field of human affairs, we must assume that behavior
is lawful and determined. We must expect to discover that what a
man does is the result of specifiable conditions and that once these
conditions have been discovered, we can anticipate and to some
extent determine his actions. (6)

This passage from Skinner gives us a clear idea of what he views
science to be and what he believes it should accomplish. For
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Skinner, science is a way of ordering the world. And for Skinner,
it is the ultimate way of doing so. As he says, we assume that this
order exists;, it is the aim of science to discover the nature of this
order. Thus order becomes something naturally occurring in the
world; all science must do is discover and delineate this preexisting order. And once this order is indeed discovered and understood, it can be used to predict and control human behavior and
action, which for Skinner is the ultimate goal of science and its
disciplines.
In his work Verbal Behavior then, Skinner attempts to extend
the methods and ideas that he discussed above to what he
describes as a subdivision of human behavior in general. As he
briefly states, "We must find the functional relations which govern the verbal behavior to b~ explained" (VB, 10),1 In stating
this, Skinner rejects other traditional formulations and attempts
to explain language, such as those put forth by classical rhetoric,
logic, grammar, criticism, semantics, and other disciplines. As
Skinner describes it, these previous formulations of verbal behavior rely too much on ideas (or events taking place inside of a person) or meanings (something "expressed or communicated by an
utterance"). One can see the behaviorist basis of Skinner in his
rejection of these formulations, as both ideas and meanings rely
on something th~t cannot be seen or observed, whereas behavior
is "out there" and can be physically perceived and described.
What Skinrier believes one needs to understand human verbal
behavior are "causes of behavior which have an acceptable scientific status and which ... will be susceptible to measurement and
manipulation" (VB, 10).

1. Refetences to Skinner's Verbal Bthavior will be given parenthetically within the
text citing the page number preceeded by VB when the tide is not mentioned in
the sentence.
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One can already see the stirrings of Skinner's invocation of
science here. It is from here that Skinner goes on to describe
what he calls his "new formulation" of verbal behavior:
Our first responsibility is simple description: what is the topography of this subdivision of human behavior? Once that question
has been answered ... we may advance

to

the stage of explanation:

what conditions are relevant to the occurrence of the behavior ... what are the variables of which it is a function? Once these
have been identified, we can account for the dynamic characteristics of verbal behaviors within a framework appropriate to human
behavior as a whole. (VB, 10)

What Skinner wants to do is create a framework or structure for
verbal behavior in such a way that this framework will allow us
to understand and, consequently, predict and control that
behavior. In general, one could say that Skinner views human
verbal behavior as determined by a finite number of variables or
conditions that, once science discovers and determines them,
will allow us to control verbal behavior. He even wants to
account for the "dynamic" or unpredictable aspects of verbal
behavior by use of this framework. Skinner concludes this
description of his new formulation by insisting "that the conditions appealed to in the analysis be ... accessible and manipulable.
The formulation is inherently practical .... It makes no appeal to
hypothetical explanatory entities. The ultimate aim is the prediction and control of verbal behavior" (VB, 12).
Prediction, explanation, control, causation, measurement,
manipulation, variables, conditions, etc. are all ideas and terms
that Skinner uses. They are also all traditional adages of science
"and scientific study. It is simple enough to see that Skinner is
adopting a scientific paradigm in his approach to understanding
verbal behavior. Skinner's goal, the prediction and control of
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human behavior, is also that of science which likewise seeks to
predict and control the variables in what its practitioners study.
They both view their objects of study as being subject to certain
conditions or variables that, once they have been determined
and understood, will allow us to understand that object of study.
In this case, for Skinner that object is human verbal behavior.
But in insisting that his approach is a "new formulation,"
Skinner automatically sets his approach against those other
approaches to understanding human behavior, and verbal behavior specifically. The one approach that Skinner deals with
throughout his text is that of literature, as that seems to be the
previous approach that has the best understanding of human
behavior. And Skinner often sets the two approaches of science
and literature against each other in his text:
Human behavior is an extremely difficult subject matter. The methods of science have come to be applied to it very late in the history
of science, and the account is still far from complete. But it is the
fidd in which literature is most competent, secure, and effective. A
Dostoyevsky, a Jane Austen, a Stendhal, a Mdville, a Tolstoy, a
Proust, or a Joyce seem to show a grasp of human behavior which is
beyond the methods of science. Insofar as literature simply describes
human behavior in narrative form, it cannot be said to show understanding at all. (VB, 98)

What Ski~ner is writing about here is the difference between
simply describing behavior versus truly understanding it and
how it happens. For Skinner, literature stops at the level of
description. While there is no doubt that literature has perfected
the art of depicting and describing human behavior in a way that
Skinner describes as beyond what science can do, this has been
done without any true understanding or knowledge of how that
behavior functions and happens. Literature for Skinner works
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best as a description or as an example of human behavior (and
Skinner uses literature for this purpose throughout Verbal
Behavior.) .Science on the other hand goes beyond literature and
the simple description of behavior. It instead describes and
explains human behavior: how it functions, what conditions it
arises out of, its patterns, and so on. In effect, for Skinner, science enables us to truly understand human behavior. Literature
therefore appears to have knowledge of human behavior, but for
Skinner that knowledge is of the appearance of human behavior.
Literature has no understanding of what Skinner sees as the
process of behavior, which for him is what enables one to truly
understand behavior.
Skinner goes on to describe literature, especially its use of
metaphor, as "prescientific." Specifically, Skinner writes that "lit_
erature is prescientific in the sense that it talks about things or
events before science steps in ... and is less inclined to talk about
them afterward" (VB, 98). Skinner sees literature's use of
metaphor as lying at the core of literature's prescientific nature,
and delineates both literature's use of metaphor and how science
treats metaphor differently. According to Skinner, literature
... is rich in metaphor... those far-fetched generic or metaphorical
extensions which are semi-intellectual in their effect but which
would not be tolerated within the stricter canons of science. In scientific writing only a modest metaphorical extension is permitted ....
The distinction is in how far the metaphor had been 'fetched,' the
scientific verbal community having learned ... that far-fetched
metaphors are sddom productive of other useful verbal behavior or
effective action. (VB, 396)

This discussion becomes interesting in that Skinner does not
completely eliminate the use of metaphor from the practice of
science. Instead, he describes a difference in the extent to which
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literature and science use metaphor. As he writes, "Literature in
general ... creates [its] own vocabularies by connecting verbal
forms with descriptions of particular events or occasions from
which they may then be metaphorically extended" (VB, 99). The
example that Skinner uses to demonstrate this process is from
the myth of Hercules. In that case, the particular heroic actions
or efforts of the specific mythological being known as Hercules
become ·a metaphor for great or heroic efforts, leading to the
term "Herculean effort." Skinner speaks of this as the general
process of metaphor. And it is only after this process that a term,
I r " can h ave any "·cal"
such as "HercuIean errort,
practl
use, W h·lCh
for Skinner means in the practice of science:
When the literary expression is reinforced in its own right, it
becomes useful in straight description. This takes the metaphorical
force out ... and gives us no clue as to what is happening when the
term is used metaphorically. It leads, however, to a more and more
complex and effective nonmetaphorical terminology descriptive of
human personality. The scientific effectiveness of such a vocabulary
will derive from the actual contingencies of reinforcement in the scientific community, not from its metaphorical origins. Any survival
of the latter would interfere with scientific use. (VB, 99)

As Skinner describes it, a metaphorical term such as "Herculean
effort" that literature creates carries much more with it than a
simple description of an event. It carries reference to its origins
in the labors of Hercules from which it was extended. It is only
when a term moves beyond its metaphoric origins that it
becomes useful in scientific description. In effect, the term must
be divorced from its metaphorical origins and its ties of reference
to that origin for it to be used "scientifically." In literature, a
metaphorical term is useful because it conjures up certain images
and ideas through its use of reference. In science, Skinner feels
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that these images and ideas get in the way and it is the descriptive effect that makes the term useful. He describes this difference in the use of metaphor as
... one of the great differences between science and literature.
Scientific verbal behavior is set up and maintained because of certain
practical consequences .... In literature there are no similar practical
consequences and metaphorical extensions therefore prevail. No one
will deny that they are effective; but the advantage we gain by reading a Dostoyevsky or Joyce, in coming to share their 'knowledge' or
'understanding' of human nature, is very different from the advantage gained from scientific study. (VB, 99)

Skinner makes this point again later as he states that
Generic extensions are tolerated in scientific practice, but metaphorical, metonymical, and solecistic extensions are usually extinguished
or punished. Metaphorical extensions may occur, but either the controlling property is quickly emphasized by additional contingencies
which convert the response into an abstraction or the metaphor is
robbed of its metaphorical nature through the advent of additional
stimulus control. (VB, 419)

In setting up this opposition between scientific and literary discourse, Skinner has begun an argument that runs throughout
the length of his text. Where science according to Skinner deals
with facts and is objective, the necessity and practicality of science in the face of these pre-existing methods must be argued for
before it is accepted. In approaching the study of human behavior, Skinner has encountered a subject that, as he acknowledges,
,has seemingly been understood by literary methods. And in fact,
Skinner admits that what literature has contributed to this study
has some use to it. What Skinner has to offer is a new formulation, and any «new" creation automatically assumes that there is
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an "old" formulation to begin with. It also automatically assumes
that this "new" formulation is different in some important way
from the "old" one, and that that difference is indeed useful. All
this sets up an opposition which must of course be argued. And
arguing is exactly what Skinner is doing throughout Verbal
Behavior. This results in an almost undercutting of Skinner's
assumptions about science versus literature. Throughout this
argument, Skinner makes the literary approach seem somewhat
primitive and underdeveloped in comparison to science. Hence
the term "prescientific" with which he labels it. Indeed, in asserting that literature is the simple depiction or portrayal of behavior, Skinner is echoing an argument that began with Aristotle
and his Poetics. Skinners description of the relationship between
literature and human behavior {or action to use Aristotle's terminology} is a mimetic relationship. Literature is simply the
description and portrayal of behavior, which for Skinner gives no
understanding of that behavior. Skinner champions science on
the other hand as a "true" understanding of huma~ behavior, in
that it sets out to understand the processes and conditions that
lead to behavior. Skinner describes the knowledge that the scientific approach can impart about human behavior as a superior
successor to the literary approach. But, again, this is something
that must be argued. The superiority of the scientific approach
over the literary one is not a given, but is instead an assertion
that Skinner makes and must then argue for. The merits of science are not inherent, but must be demonstrated by Skinner
himsel£ It is clear that while describing his theory about human
verbal behavior, Skinner likewise engages in this argument for
the bulk of his work.
In effect what Skinner has done is adopt a new and untested
structur~ for the study of human behavior, and. verbal behavior
as a particular subset of that. This structure is of course what
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Skinner would call "scientific." This makes it necessary to look
at the structure he has adopted and how it describes behavior.
The rubric under which Skinner has placed his ideas is that of
"science." And it is this rubric within which' he wants to place
the study of human behavior, including verbal behavior. In order
to accomplish this, Skinner must demonstrate that verbal behavior is indeed capable of scientific treatment. In essence, this
means, as Skinner stated himself, that verbal behavior must be
shown to be orderly, predictable, and controllable. And it is in
this effort that Skinner reveals what exacdy he means by the term
"science," and what he envisions for the study of human behavior and psychology in general.
Two processes, or paradigms as Skinner calls them, will serve
to demonstrate Skinner's notion of "science." These processes are
those of what Skinner calls the "mand" and the "tact," and will
be discussed in detail further on. The first of these is that of the
mand, and Skinner graphically depicts this process as shown
below (V7J, 38):
SPEAKER
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Skinner describes this process as a stimulus-response process,
which for Skinner is the basis of human verbal behavior and
interaction. In this specific example, the speaker's hunger and
the presence of a receptive audience (Sd) lead the speaker to
request or "mand" the bread, which serves as a stimulus for
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the audience to pass the bread (R), thus reinforcing the
speaker's request. This leads the speaker to say "Thank you,"
(Rv) a stimulus (sreinV+ Sd) for the audience to again reinforce

(Rv) the speaker with "You're welcome." Clearly this process
sa~isifes

the scientific goal of orderliness, prediction, and control that Skinner desires for the study of behavior. But this
same process or pattern also exists outside of the stimulusresponse process, and in the physical sciences. The most obvious example to draw from is chemistry, specifically the chemical reaction process. To be somewhat simplistic, in the chemical reaction, elements and/or compounds are combined
under certain controlled conditions. Assuming that these
conditions exist, the result of this combination can then be
predicted. To take a rather simple example, the combination
of two hydrogen molecules with one oxygen molecule will
result in the creation of water. The same pattern can also be
found in Skinner's paradigms of verbal behavior. To again use
this specific example of the mand, the "elements" would be
the speaker and the audience, and the conditions would be
that the speaker is hungry, the bread is available, and the
audience is receptive to the speaker's request or mand. These
conditions thus lead the speaker to request the bread, and the
audience to pass the bread to the speaker. Once the audience
has passed the bread, ~he speaker now thanks the audience for
doing so, and the audience consequently acknowledges that
thanks with "You're welcome." This process is clearly an
ordered one in that certain actions follow other actions. It is
also predictable, as one can predict what will happen from
one action to the next. Finally, it too can be controlled, as
knowledge of the "elements" or conditions that determine
and shape this interaction will allow one to control and
manipulate this sequence of behaviors.
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As mentioned earlier, the same basic-chemical-process
appears,in depicting the process of what Skinner describes as the
"tact." Again, Skinner uses a paradigm that he has created to
visually depict this process (VB, 84):
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In this instance, the elements are the speaker, the audience and
the red object. When the red object and the audience are combined in a context or condition that facilitates the naming of the
object's color, the result is the speaker's emission of the statement
"Red." This statement in turn results in the audience's response
of "Right!" which, while Skinner identifies it as reinforcement, is
also a result of this second "verbal reaction." Again, this process
is orderly, predictable, and controllable in the same basic way as
the mand and the chemical reaction.
Clearly the process of language is more complex than the
simple example of the chemical reaction that leads to water. But
the same pattern exists in both instances. In describing the pattern or paradigm of the mand and the tact, Skinner uses the
stimulus-response pattern as the foundation of this interaction
between speaker and audience, and indeed, this pattern guides
his entire theory concerning verbal behavior. But this complex
process of stimulus-response is similar to that of the chemical
reaction, as in both cases, the combination of certain "elements"
under specific and determined conditions leads to a predictable,
and ultimately controllable result. One will of course remember
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that this is one of the goals that Skinner set before himself in his
conception of human verbal behavior, in that it must be conceptualized in such a way that it could be predicted and controlled. This is exactly what Skinner has done. He has created a
paradigm for the process of verbal behavior that facilitates, if not
demands, the achieveIpent of his goal.
This is not the only case of Skinner's "fetching" science as a
way of understanding and structuring the process of verbal
behavior. What this particular paradigm does is make language
and the process of verbal behavior both quantifiable and formulaic. In essence, one need only know certain variables in the situation in order to create a certain result. And Skinner goes on to
apply aspects of the physical sciences in further descriptions of
verbal behavior. For example, he goes on to describe some of
what he calls the "dynamic properties" of the mand after describing its basic process:
The energy level of the mand may vary from very faint to very loud,
and the speed with which it is emitted when the occasion arises may
vary from very fast to very slow. If the pattern is of substantial
length, it may be executed slowly or rapidly. If the reinforcement is
not immediately forthcoming, the response may be emitted only
once or may be repeated. These properties vary as the result of many
conditions in the past and present history of the speaker. Particularly
relevant are level of deprivation and intensity of aversive stimulation
and the extent to which a given listener or someone like him has
reinforced similar responses in the past (or has refused to do so).
Such conditions have a relatively greater effect upon the mand than
upon the other types ofverbal behavior to be discussed in later chapters. The wide range of dynamic properties which result makes
the mad a very expressive type of operant.
The probability and intensity of the listener's behavior may also
vary over a wide range. If the listener is not already predisposed to
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act, the probability of his mediating a reinforcement may depend
upon the effectiveness of the aversive stimulation supplied by the
speaker. Some listeners are accustomed to taking orders-they
have felt the unconditioned aversive consequences of not doing
so-and respond appropriately to simple mands. Others are more
likely to react to softened forms. The intonation, loudness, or
other indications that the speaker will supply aversive consequences has an appropriate effect. A hesitant or weak request or
command is least likely to be reinforced. A loud and threatening
response is likely to be reinforced subject only to the relative
strength of listener and sp'eaker. It is to be noted that mands are
characteristic of most hypnotic ipstructions, and the extent to
which the subject co-operates or obliges the hypnotist will depend
upon the kinds of variables here being considered. These variables
enter into what is called the authority or prestige of the speaker.
(VB,42-43)

Throughout this passage, Skinner makes reference to the mand
and the process it involves as possessing such properties as energy, speed, intensity, probability, strength, and frequency, all of
which are scientific (and again, this refers to the physical sciences) terms and concepts. Skinner goes on to show how one can
make predictions of what will occur in a verbal interaction based
on the quantity or intensity of these dynamic properties. This
again facilitates Skinner's goal of making the study of verbal
behavior a part of scientific study.
But it is important to note just how Skinner is applying these
principles of the physical sciences to verbal behavior, and what
this application does to the relationship between science and verbal behavior. As' Skinner himself described it, this scientific
methodology is an entirely new way of structuring the process of
verbal behavior. And Skinner's justification for adopting this
structure is his belief that through it, we can learn the "true"
nature of verbal behavior, allowing us to understand, predict,
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and ultimately control that process. The important thing to note
here is this idea of having to work through this structure. Earlier,
Skinner described how the literary approach attempted to conceptualize and understand the process of verbal behavior. Again,
this was another structure through which people who studied
language had to work in order to get to language. But in stating
this, Skinner is immediately creating structures even before he
turns to' studying language. In attempting to bring the study of
verbal behavior under the rubric of science, Skinner automatically assumes a structure in which there is such a thing as science.
Consequently, this move also results in the conceptualization of
things that could be seen as "not science." And it is this latter category under which Skinner places the current literary understanding of verbal behavior. In essence, science is another structure through which one must work through. In that, it is no different from a literary structure or approach. Both color and
determine the perception and discussion of what constitues and
what is important to the study of verbal behavior.
The specific problem Skinner has with this literary approach,
and the reason why he saw the scientific approach as more valuable and useful, was its blatant use of metaphor. The process of
metaphor is of course the likening of two disparate things to
another in such a way that one serves to describe, or structure,
the other. John Donne's poem "A Valediction Forbidding
Mourning" serves as a good example of this. In that poem,
Donne likens a pair of separated lovers to a geometer's compass,
in which one foot remains in place while the other moves
around, though this second foot always comes back to where it
started. This metaphor, this conceptualization, this structure,
gives us a particular way of thinking about the separation of
these two lovers. To return to the study of language, the literary
approach gives us one particular way of conceptualizing and
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structuring and thinking about the process of verbal behavior.
This conceptualization is one based on metaphorical relationships which, according to Skinner, is an insufficient way to produce understanding.
But Skinner's adoption of science as a structure or conceptualization of verbal behavior is inherently metaphorical in nature.
Where literature was a method that used metaphor to understand verbal behavior, Skinner's adoption and extension of the
scientific approach to language is a metaphorical extension.
These scientific principles that Skinner is applying to verbal
behavior are simply a new way of structuring and understanding
that process. One will recall that Skinner earlier described how
literature in its use of metaphor came to "fetch" or extend these
metaphors to the point where they were no longer of use.
Science he said was different because it limited its use of
metaphor to only a modest amount, and also ((knew" when to
stop fetching or extending those metaphors. But, as was demonstrated above in the description of Skinner's mand and tact paradigms, what Skinner is in effect doing when he says he is using
a scientific approach to understanding verbal behavior is indeed
extending the concepts of the physical sciences such as chemistry
or physics, to the process of verbal behavior, a domain which is
not currently within the strictures of science. His extension of
the chemical reaction process as the basis of the process of verbal
behavior is only a single example of how Skinner does this. But
it serves to show the intrinsically metaphorical nature of what
Skinner is attempting to do. Skinner's entire use of science as an
approach to studying verbal behavior is based on much more
than a modest metaphorical extension.
In effect, what Skinner is approaching is not so much a new
formulation or methodology for the study of literature, though
this may be a consequence of his actions. Instead what Skinner
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proposes is in essence an exchange of metaphors for conceptualizing the process and nature of verbal behavior. The literary and
scientific approaches that Skinner draws distinctions between are
actually two opposing metaphorical structures that attempt to
describe these processes. Skinner is simply choosing to adopt the
scientific way of viewing language, and it is this metaphor which
he is constantly working through. One could liken it to a kind
of filter between Skinner and language, as his adoption of a certain metaphor or structure colors and shapes how he will
approach and come to understand this construct. One could
even go so far as to describe Skinner's use of metaphor and structure as operating on two levels~ Skinner operates on one level in
his adoption of science as his metaphor for understanding
human verbal behavior. This autom~tically is the creation of a
structure that includes science and "not science" with those
approaches or metaphors that fall under the rubric of science
being more highly valued then those belonging to "not science."
But this structure is again ~etaphorical in being only one way to
structure the world. ~ne could just as easily create a structure of
literary and "not literary" in which the literary metaphor is valued more highly. And it is of course this second structure or
metaphor which Skinner is working against and hopes to supplant with his own.
Skinner also operates metaphorically at another level as,
upon his adoption of the scientific paradigm or metaphor, he
then applies those things which have been id~ntified as science
to a subject matter. that is "not science." This is of course demonstrated in his application of the physical sciences and such things
as the chemical reaction and various scientific properties to
describe the mand and tact processes. This chemical reaction is
a metaphorical restructuring of verbal behavior by Skinner. In
this application, Skinner is operating at the level of actual lan85

guage in his extension, or fetching, of the scientific metaphor
that he has adopted to specific prQcesses of language.
Skinner then is adopting science as an approach to understanding language and verbal behavior. In d~ing so, Skinner creates a structure in which a scientific approach to this study is
more highly valued than other approaches. But' Skinner's creation of structures does not end with this structure of approaches nor with his metaphorical application of the physical sciences
to specific verbal processes and interactions. In his study of language and verbal behavior, Skip.ner creates his own structures of
verbal behavior. that he casts within the scientific vein. Of course,
the creation of structures to shape one's understanding of a subject is not new with ~kin~er, and this process is one that has been
often examined. One of those figures that dealt with the issue of
creating structures was Fried.rich Nietzsche in his work ((Truth
and Falsity in an Ultramoral Sense." In that text, Nietzsche
describes the process by which structures such as Skinner's eventually came to be developed:
EvelY idea originates through equating the u.p.equal. As certainly as
no one leafis exactly similar to any o.ther, so certain is it that the idea
"leaf' has been formed through an arbitrary omission of those individual differences, through a forgetting of the differentiating qualities, and this idea now awakens the notion that in nature there is,
besides the leaves, a something called the "leaf," perhaps a primal
form according to which all leaves were woven, drawn, accurately
measured, colored, crinkled, painted, but by unskilled hands, so that
no copy had turned out correct and trustworthy as a true copy of the
primal form. (1992, 636)

This first passage from Nietzsch~ points out a fundamental difficulty in creating structures. In structures, things or objects are
grouped together under some concept or term, such as "leaf" in
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Nietzsche's example, that ignores the fact that each and every
object within that gr9uP is different. Without those differences,
there would be no need to categorize them as they would all be
the same object. The result of this according to Nietzsche is that
we come to adopt this structure or categorization, which
Nietzsche sees as arbitrary, and eventually come to believe that
this idea or concept that we hold is indeed true. As Nietzsche
himself then asks,
What therefore is truth? A mobile army of metaphors, metonymies,
anthropomorphisms: in shon a sum of human rdations which
become poetically and rhetorically intensified, metamorphosed,
adorned, and after long usage seems to a nation fixed, canonic, and
binding; truths are illusions of which one has forgotten that they are
illusions. (1992,636)

Important in these passages from Nietzsche are the ideas of
"nature," "arbitrary," "illusions" and "forgetting." For Nietzsche,
the arbitrary essence of concepts and structures stems from the
fact that they are human creations, and not some natural occurrence. Structures are not created in or by nature, but are instead
human ideas of how the world works. These ideas are then
imposed on nature of the world by man. All structures then are
created by a human equating of things that are essentially different. According to Nietzsche, these concepts and structures
become so ingrained in human beings through their usage that
the structure is what comes to be seen as nature, when it is in fact
an ,artificial and human construct. This is where the idea of forgetting comes in, as Nietzsche sees man creating these artificial
structures, and then forgetting the fact that they were indeed created, and subsequently treating them as though they were "true."
With this critique of structures in mind, we can turn to
examining the structures of language that Skinner creates in
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Verbal Behavior. The first structure of Skinner's to be examined
will be his actual conception of how languag~ and'verhal behavior function. This is of course the structure alluded to previously, being composed of what Skinner calls the "mand~" the (~tact,"
and the "autoclitic." Skinner also creates a structure to the use of
language and :verbal behavior-that also bears examining, and this
will be looked at through Skinner's creation .of "verbal commu-

.. "
nltles.
The first part of the three-part structure that Skinner deals
with i~ the mand. As Skinner defines it, this is "the type ofverbal operant in wllich< a respo~s~ of given form is characteristically foll?wed by ~ gi~en consequence in a'verbal com~unity" (VB,
35). Skinner goes on to give specific ~~ples ~fwhat responses
and what consequences he is describing:
In a given verbal community, cert~n respoJ;l$.es are characteristically
followed

by certain co11$equences.. Wtfit! is followed

by someone's

waiting and Sh-hlby silence. MuclJ. ?f t~e v~rbal behavior 'of young
. children is of this sort. Candy! is characteristically followed by the
receipt of Candy and Out! by the' opening of a door. These effects are
bot inevitable, but we can usually find one consequence of each
response which is commoner than any other. (VB. 35)

One. can clearly s~e the kind .of rel~tioQship .Skinner is identifYing here. And he goes .on to .say that this '~basic relationship
has· been reGognized. in syptactic and .gra~mati~ analyses
(expressions such ,as the "imperative mood" and "commands.
and entreaties" suggest ~etnselves) but no, traditional tet:m can
safely be used here" (VB, 35). This again d~P1onstrates.how
Ski~ner rejects previous conc.eptions o(y~rbal behavior, .as here
he objects. to terms derived from. grammatical, or rhetorical
studies of language. It is here. that Ski~ner ,c(-eates the "mand."
He "also gives v.ery p:;u-ticular req,sons for. cr,eating this term, as
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he states that ((the term 'mand' has certain mnemonic value
derived from 'command,' 'demand,' 'countermand,' and so on,
and is conveniently brief" (TIB, 35). This idea of convenience
seems to serve as the basis for Skinner's structure, and also
serves to harken back some of the criticisms Nietzsche made of
structures in general that exist within Skinner's structure. To
begin with, the term "mand" serves much the same purpose as
Nietzsche described the term "leaf" as serving. Both terms are
in essence a grouping together of similar things under one
rubric or category. But just as Nietzsche stated that this grouping ignores the fact that all leaves are different, Skinner's creation of the mand ignores the differences that exist within that
category. And Skinner himself even points out these differences. As seen in the second quotation from Skinner, the relationship that defines the mand is not an absolute one. The consequences that result ~rom the use of a mand are not always the
same, and indeed Skinner states that one can. identify a common consequence. This inherently implies that there exist
uncommon consequences, or differences in the consequences
of the various verbal operants that Skinner groups under the
term mand. To go back to Nietzsche's example, just as the term
"leaf" was used to describe all kinds of different and distinct
leaves, Skinner uses the term "mand" to describe a body of verbal operants that are not necessarily consistently alike in their
consequences, nor does the same mand have consistently the
same result.
The second part of this structure that Skinner creates is that
of the "tact." And again, Skinner gives a specific example of the
relationship he is attempting to describe:
The three-term contingency in this type of operant is exemplified
when, in the presence of a doll, a child frequently achieves some sort
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of generalized reinforcement by saying doll:, or when a teleost fish, or
picture th~eof, is the occasion upon which the student of zoology is
reinforced when he says teleostfish. (VB, 81)

In other words, the tact is a response made in the presence of
some object or event, such as the doll in this example. The
process
which Skinner creates a name for this type of ve~bal
operant parallels that by which he created the mand. For example, as iiI the case of the mand, Skinner rejects other previous
attempts to describe this relationship:

br

There is no suitable term for this type of operant. "Sign," "symbol,"
and more technical terms from logic and semantics commit us to
special schemes of reference and stress the verbal response itself
rather than the controlling relationship. (VB, 81)

From here, Skinner creates his new grouping term and describes
the particular relationship that drives it:
The invented term "tact" will be used here. The term carries a
mnemonic suggestion of behavior which "makes contact with" the
physical world. A tact may be defined as a verbal operant in which a
response of given form is evoked (or at least strengthened) by a particular object or event or property of an object or event. We account
for the strength by showing that in the presence of the object or
event a response of that form is characteristically reinforced in a
given verbal community.
It may be tempting to say that in a tact the response "refers to,"
"mentions," "announces," "talks about," "names," "denotes," or
"describes" its stimulus. But the essential relation between
response and controlling stimulus is precisely the same as in
echoic, textual, and intraverbal behavior. We are not likely to say
that the intraverbal stimulus is "referred to" by all the responses it
evokes, or that an echoic or textual response "mentions" or
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describes" its controlling variable. The only useful functional rela-

tion is expressed in the statement that the presence of a given stimulus raises the probability of occurrence of a given form of
response. This is also the essence of the tact. (VB, 81-82)

As can be seen from this passage, much of what was said about
Skinner's mand can also be applied to the tact. Both are categorical terms in that Skinner attempts to group a set of verbal
operants within these terms. In the use of both terms, Skinner
demonst~ates his rejection of previous attempts to structure verbal behavior. Furthermore, both terms are created based on a
mnemonic sense as well as a need for convenience. In this, one
can see Skinner's influence from rhetorical practice, as it is
much easier to describe a groups of such terms by a single name
then having to repeatedly describe it, for instance, as "a verbal
operant in which a response of given form is characteristically
foll9wed by a given consequence" in the case of the mand. This
rhetorical influence seems to be a strong one in Skinner, as his
creation of these terms is as much driven by the mnemonic relationships that he finds as they are by the fact that a single term
to describe a body of operants will make it much easier to present and argue for his structure as well as simply making language easier to deal with.
The creation of the tact also bears the same Nietzschean
flaws that the creation of the mand did. As with any grouping
term, the tact ignores the differences inherent in the body of
operants it attempts to describe. As was the case with the mand,
Skinner seems to acknowledge these differences, even as his use
of the term ignores them. In the above passage quoted from
Skinner, he describes the relationship of the tact as based on
probability. In effect, with the presentation of a particular object
or event, the probability that a given response will occur increas-
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es. But again, this response is not a given, just as a particular consequence of a maud was also not definite .. In the use of such
terms as "characteristically reinforced" and "increased probability," Skinner is again demonstrating that the relationship that he
is describing in the tact is not an absolute. The use of these terms
to describe this relationship automatically implies that sometimes this relationship does not hold true. Again, there are differences within the relationship that Skinner identifies as the tact
that are ignored when he uses this terril.
The third term that completes Skinner's structure of verbal
behavior is also his most difficult to grasp. This term is of course
what he calls the "autoelitic." Skinner defines the autoelitic as
"intended to suggest behavior which is based upon or depends
upon other verbal behavior" (VB, 315). In essence, the autoelitic seems to work between the mand and the tact and in some
. ways, qualifies them. Skinner goes on to describe particular
kinds of autoelities, which results in three subcategories of autoelities. The first of these are "descriptive autoelities," which
Skinner defines as "responses ... associated with other. verbal
behavior effective upon the same listener at the same time" (v.B,
315). As examples, Skinner describes various types of descriptive autoelities:
One type of descriptive autoclitic informs the listener of the kind of
verbal operant it accompanies. If the speaker is reading a newspaper
and remarks I see it is going to rain, the I see informs the listener that

it is going to rain is emitted as a textual response .... Another group
of autoclitics describe the state of strength of a response. I guess, I
estimate, I believe, I imagine, and I surmise all indicate that the
response which follows is based upon insufficient stiqlUlation or has
been .poorly conditioned .... Another group of autoclitics describe
relations between a response and other verbal behavior of the speaker or listener, or other circumstances under which behavior is emit-
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ted. Important examples are I agree, I confess, I expect, I concede, I

infer, I predict, I dare say, I must say, I can say, I admit, I reply, I should
say, and I mean to say. All of these permit the listener to rdate the
response which follows

to

other aspects of the current situation, and

hence to react to it more efficiently. (VB, 315)

In essence, these descriptive autoclities are certain phrases that
describe or indicate something about the response they modify.
The second type of autoclitic that Skinner creates is the "qualifying autoclitic," which he describes as serving the "function of
qualifying a tact in such a way that the intensity or direction of
the listener's behavior is modified" (VB, 322). The two examples
he uses here are negation and assertion. The effect of these qualifying autoclities is a change in the listener's behavior. In the case
of negation, the listener's behavior ceases, whereas assertion
encourages behavior. The third and final type of autoclitic that
Skinner describes is that of the quantifying autoclitic, and in this
Skinner deals with such words as the, a, some, and other words
that indicate some sort of amount or quantity, and each has a
different effect on the listener and his subsequent, behavior.
In the autoclitic, one begins to see how these three terms,
which originally seem to be simple descriptions of particular
aspects of verbal behavior, begin to reflect more and more of a
structure or framework to language and verbal behavior. The
autoclitic seems to move between and mediate or modify
Skinner's mands and tacts. In the three subcategories of autoclities, one can see in each one a different modification of the
mand and tact and their effects both on the speaker's and the
listener's behavior.
Clearly, the mand and the tact are the focal points of the
structure or framework that Skinner is slowly developing in
Verbal Behavior. While the autoclitic does possess a particular
function, its very function is defined in terms of these other two
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categories. As can b~ seen, the mand and the tact are no longer
simple categories of language, but are instead actual processes of
langu~ge that people using language actually use. In his original

conception of these two terms, the mand and the tact' were simply categories to identify certain types of verbal operants that
seem to regularly occur in verbal behavior. But as Skinner continues his analysis of verbal behavior, it becomes clear that the
mand and tact are no longer simple descriptions. Instead, they
become what people actually do in language. In several places
throughout Verbal Behavior, Skinner describes people in a verbal community doing what can only be called "manding" and
«
•
"
tactlng
:
The poet is affected here by the reinforcements which are responsible for the vulgar forms Look, See, and Listen-forms which mainly
call attention to the speaker (Listen, have you seen George?, Look, can
you give me some help? or See here, what are you up to?). See is also used
to mand attention to something being described (There he stood. see,
and I said to him... ). The poetic variant of See is Behold. The poet
mands the listener to see someone sitting upon a grassy green and to
hark, not only to his words, but to the lark. He also mands him to
speak up (Tell me, where is fancy bred?), to be quiet (Oh, never say
that I was false ofheart) and to co-operate in various practical affairs
related to the poet's deprivations: Come, let us kiss, Come live with me
and be my love, Take, 0 take those lips away, or Drink to me only with

thine eyes. (VB, 30)
When a cook tacts a given state of affairs with the simple
announcement Dinner!, she creates a verbal occasion upon which
one may successfully sit down to the table. But the listener does
not sit down to, or eat, the verbal stimulus. The kind of response
which can be made to both the dinner and the verbal stimulus
Dinner/is exemplified by the salivary response conditioned according to the Pavlovian formula. The practical behavior of the listener (the consequences of which are ultimately responsible for the
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development of the verbal response in the first place) must be formulated as a discriminated operant involving three terms, no two
of which provide a parallel for the notion of a symbol. (VB, 88)

As can be seen in these two passages, Skinner is no longer using
his terms of mand and tact to describe or identify certain patterns of verbal behavior. In fact, the mand and the tact have
become behaviors themselves. Where before these two concepts
were created to group a number of particular verbal behaviors,
these two passages show that Skinner now sees the mand and the
tact as actual processes of language and verbal behaviors.
From this point, these two processes become explanations of
other aspects of human verbal behavior. Skinner deals with these
other aspects as extensions of both the mand and the tact
processes. To begin, Skinner identifies two types of extended
mands. Both of these share the same basic process of the mand.
But the extension that Skinner is dealing with here is an extension that makes the mand process in these cases somewhat
unique. The two extended mands that Skinner deals with are
what he calls "superstitious mands" and "magical mands.))
Skinner defines superstitious mands as "mands which cannot be
explained by arguing that responses of the same form have been
reinforced under similar circumstances" (VB, 47). In other
words, these are mands that occur as a result of other successful
mands, but this is not due to any C<?nsistent reinforcement or
success. The specific example that Skinner uses is gambling:
The dice player exclaims Come sevm!, for example, even though he
has not asked for and got sevens anywhere. Accidental reinforcement of the response appears to be the explanation .... The player
may readily admit that there is no mechanical connection between
his response and the behavior of the dice, but he retains the response
in some strength and continues to utter it . .. (VB, 47)
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The second type of extended mand is what Skinner calls the
"magical mand." He defines these as mands "which cannot be
accounted for by showing that they have even had the effect
specified or any similar effect upon similar occasions" (VB, 48).
Skinner goes on to give examples of what he means:
The speaker appears to create new mands on the analogy of old ones.
Having effectively manded bread and butter, he goes on to mand
the jam, even though he has never obtained jam before in this way.
The poet exclaims Milton, thou shouldrt be living in this hour!,
although he has never successfully addressed Milton before nor
brought anyone to life with a similar response. The special relation
between response and consequence exemplified by the mand establishes a general pattern of control over the environment. In
moments of sufficient stress, the speaker simply describes the reinforcement appropriate to a given state of deprivation or aversive
stimulation. The response must, of course, already be part of his verbal repertoire as some other type of verbal operant. (VB, 48)

In a way, the magical mand is an extension of the superstitious
mand, in that, where the superstitious mand was based on
accidental reinforcement of previous mands, the magical
mand, while still based on previous mands, has never been
reinforced. Thus it seems just one step beyond the supersitious
mand, and further and further from a true mand. In both of
these extensions, Skinner asserts that the mand process is
operating in the behavior of the speaker. These extensions for
Skinner only exist because the mand process has proven successful due to previous experience of it being reinforced. One
can see here how the mand has been metamorphosed beyond
a simply descriptive category and into an explanatory process.
The mand itself is now a process of verbal behavior that can
be extended beyond its normal use and context. Inherent in
both of these extensions is an assumption and acceptance of
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the mand as an actual aspect of verbal behavior that actively
operates in human. interaction.
A similar type of extension occurs with the tact process. In
this case, there are five types of extensions that can occur.
Skinner calls the first type of extension a "generic extension."
Skinner uses the example of a chair to demonstr~te this process.
As he describes it, a person demonstrates generic extension when
he calls a new type of chair that he encounters a "chair." This
goes back to the idea of a primal form, such as that of the leaf
which Nietzsche discussed. One has a general idea or conception
of "leaf" by which one can identify other objects as leaves. The
same thing happens with the chair. One has a general conception of "chair" by which one can identify other objects as chairs.
The second type of extension of the tact process that Skinner
identifies is a "metaphorical extension":
'When for the first time a speaker calls someone a mouse, we account
for the response by noting cenain properties-smallness, timidity,
silent movement, so on-which are common to the kind of situation
in which the response is characteristically reinforced and to the particular situation in which the response is now emitted. Since these
are not the properties used by zoologists or by the lay community as
the usual basis for reinforcing a response, we call the extension
metaphorical ... 'When a metaphorical response is effective and duly
reinforced, jt ceases to be primarily a metaphor. A man is seldom
called a mouse in an extended tact. Mous~ has become a standard
form in the reinforcing community in which small size, timidity,
and other properties play an acknowledged role. (VB, 93)

Again, this is similar to the earlier discussion of Herculean effort.
In both cases, what was a descriptive term at a particular instant
is extended into a general description of similar events. This -type
of extension is similar to what Skinner identifies as the .third type
of tact extension, the "metonymical extension:"
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Here an extension of a tact occurs when a stimulus acquires control
over the response because it freqt,lendy, acco!"parzies the stimulus
upon which reinforc~ent is norm-vly contingent. Thus, w~ say

The White House denied the rumor, although it was the President
who spoke, or You haven'/ touchedyour dinner, when the important
fact was'that the dinner
not eaten. We account for such behav-

was

ior by noting that the President and the White' House, and touching and eating,· frequently occur together. (VB, 99-100)

The difference between metaphorical and metonymical extension is that, in metonymical extension, something associated
with an object or event represents that object or event. In
metaphorical extension, the representative term is not necessarily associated with what it replaces, such as with the lovers-ascompass metaphor from Donne. Skinner labels the fourth type
of extended tact as a «solecistic extension" which Skinner
describes by saying
A still more tenuous extension of the tact is so useless and confusing to the listener that it is described with such pejorative
terms as malaprop, solecism, or catachresis. The property which
gains control of the response is only distantly related to the defining property upon which standard reinforcements are contingent
or is similar to that property for irrelevant reasons. This is not to
say that some malaprops are not effective or go unreinforced. We
may not be seriously disturbed when someone says dilemma
although a situation is merely difficult, or feasible when action is
merely possible ....

As in metaphor and metonymy, solecistic extension is commonest when no other response is available. Also, as in metaphor and
metonymy, some erroneous responses are reinforced by the verbal
community and acquire a functional, if not a social, status comparable with that of correct responses. Original mistakes are perhaps almost as rare as original metaphors. (VB, 102)
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In this example, the speaker is responding to an event or situation with terms like "dilemma" or "feasible" which are inappropriate to the situation. But these inappropriate responses are at
least not punished, if not reinforced, and thus come to be used
again. The final type of extended tact that Skinner deals with is
"nomination" or naming. This is also a process of tact extension
as one gives a name to a person or object and that name then in
turn becomes a possible response t? that person or object. In all
of these mand and tact extensions, one can see how Skinner has
turned his originally descriptive terms into processes of language
that actually occur in verbal behavior. These extensions take the
basic process of the mand and the tact that Skinner created and
applies them in inappropriate situations or contexts. Thus there
are not only inconsistencies in the consequences of a mand or
tact. There are also differences in when these patterns are used.
In effect, not only has Skinner created a structure of normal verbal behavior and patterns with the mand and the tact, but he
also creates a structure based on these artificial constructs that
accounts for times when these processes are extended or misapplied by a speaker. All of these extensions operate on an assumption that the mand and tact are regular and consistent aspects or
patterns of verbal behavior that these extensions then warp or
manipulate.
This then brings us back full circle to Nietzsche's original
concerns about the creation of structures and the apparent
operation of what Nietzsche warned about, though much earlier, in Skinner's work. As Nietzsche stated, the problem with
structures is that they are originally created and artificial, but
through their subsequent use, the created and artificial aspect
of them is forgotten and these structures then come to be seen
as how nature-or whatever construct is being studied-actually
works and functions. One could say that Skinner seems to fall
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prey to this. He begins by imposing a basically descriptive
structure on language and verbal behavior, as his terms mand,
tact, and autoclitic are all descriptive of certain aspects of verbal behavior. But then Skinner goes on to portray these terms
as being actual processes in language and actively Hsed in
human verbal interaction. No longer is Skinner content to simply identify some aspect of verbal behavior as "a mand" or "a
tact." Instead he wants to take what he sees as fundamental
aspects of verbal behavior and turn them into verbal behavior
itself. From here, Skinner begins to describe people as "manding" and "tacting," as if these were things that people actively
and consciously do. Further, he uses these created processes as
explanations of verbal behavior that seems to follow these patterns, but in some way extends them inappropriately or to
inappropriate contexts. In doing all this, Skinner forgets that
this structure he has created was imposed by him onto language. The structure of mand-tact-autoclitic was not something that simply arose out of language as a natural process of
verbal behavior. Its very essence is that of a created framework
that Skinner made in his scientific approach to studying verbal
behavior. But in using this framework to guide his study of verbal behavior, Skinner more and more depicts language as
occurring in these patterns he has identified, and ignores the
fact that he created and imposed these patterns onto language
and verbal behavior.
The issue of Skinner's created structures does not end with
this three-part structure of verbal behavior. For the most part,
this discussion has focused on Skinner's ideas about responses
made by a speaker, and little mention has been made of a listener or audience for the speaker, beyond the fact that one exists to
reinforce or punish certain behavior. When we turn to the idea
of an audience, we encounter another of Skinner's creations, that
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of what he calls the "verbal community." Th~oughout the quoted passages from Skinnees Verilal Behavior, ther~ ,has Qeen "reference to how particular aspects of verhal behavior are reinforced
or punished by a verbal community, without any real mention
of what constitutes a verbal community. Skinner does give us his
an idea of what a verbal community is:
Audiences which control the largest subdivisions of a verbal repertoire are the communities which establish the reinforcing contingencies of the so-called "languages": English, French, Chinese, and
so on. In a Chinese verbal community, only certain forms of
response are effective; as an audience, any member or group of
members of this community constitutes the occasion for the emission offorms called "Chinese." (VB, 173)

But Skinner does not limit this concept of verbal community
simply to different languages. Instead, he goes on to describe
what could be seen as more specialized verbal communities:
Within a single language community many jargons, patois, cants,
and technical vocabularies are controlled by special audiences.
When these deal with special subject matters, they need not represent control by an audience. Thus, many objects encountered on a
sailing boat are usually not encountered elsewhere. The jargon of
sailing is in this case a subdivision of a repertoire isolated only
because the occasion upon which it is appropriate is isolated. But
when an engineer talks about the low tensile strength of a worn
shoelace, he is speaking a language appropriate to a special audience
rather than a special state of affairs. In some languages (for example,
Japanese), certain forms of response are differentially reinforced by
listeners belonging to different social classes or by listeners standing
in different relations to the speaker. Each class or relationship thus
defines a special audience controlling such forms. The "little language" with which we talk to children or they to us is a repertoire
under the control of a special audience. Such a repertoire is rein-
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forced in early childhood by indulgent listeners, but it may survive
between friends into adulthood .... There are special subdivisions of
the community which also differentially reinforce bookish, pedantic,
literary, archaic, polysyllabic, and polite vocabularies, and hence
compose audiences in the presence of which these forms are particularly strong. (VB, 173-174)

In this passage, Skinner seems to be drawing a distinction
between the verbal community and an audience. The verbal
community for Skinner appears to be a group of speakers that
can be identified with a particular kind or type of verbal behavior or speech. An audience then is made up of particular persons
who belong to that verbal community. And, as mentioned
before, these communities are not simply based on what language is being spoken. As Skinner himself mentioned, these
communities are made up of people speaking a particular type of
speech, such as a technical vocabulary. And throughout his text,
Skinner makes reference to these specialized verbal communities,
as he describes such things as a scientific verbal' community or a
literary verbal community, both of which reinforce different uses
of language and different verbal behavior.
One will of course remember the distinctions Skinner drew
between the scientific and literary verbal communities. As
Skinner described it, the literary verbal community often reinforced metaphorical and metonymical usage of language. This
was opposed to the scientific verbal community which brooked
little or no metaphorical use of language, and to the extent that
it did do so, it would eliminate the metaphoric and metonymic
properties of that response. The difficulty with this sharp a distinction comes when one looks at how Skinner uses the idea of
verbal community in his text. As Skinner described it, the verbal
community is a kind of overarching structure associated with
certain kinds of verbal behavior, and audiences for verbal behav102

lor are drawn from these verbal communities. When he is
describing these audiences in the context of his discussion of verbal communities, Skinner mentions that it is the audience that
actually reinforces a particular speaker's verbal behavior. But
throughout Verbal Behavior, Skinner describes the verbal community itself as reinforcing a speaker's particular verbal behavior.
In essence, what Skinner has done is substitute the verbal community for the specific audience that is before the speaker, and
the process through which he accomplishes this is essentially a
metonymy. In describing the metonymical extension of the tact,
Skinner argued that a concept or idea normally associated with
some other concept or idea comes to symbolize and stand for
that second idea. One of the examples he used was how we often
say something similar to ((The White House said today," when
in fact it was the President, and not the White House, that
spoke. This is of course the process of metonymy, where one
thing normally associated with or accompanying another comes
to replace ~d stand for that second person, object, or so on. In
saying that the verbal community reinforces a particular aspect
of verbal behavior, Skinner is actively participating in a
metonymy. For it is not the verbal community that reinforces
the verbal behavior, but the specific members of the audience
who belong to that verbal community. These specific audience
members are associated with a particular verbal community, and
through the process of metonymy, Skinner replaces these audience members with the verbal community itself as reinforcing
verbal behavior.
In a way, Skinner bases much of his three-part structure on a
metonymical relationship as well. In his mand and tact, it is the
consequences that are normally associated with these types of
responses that allow Skinner to label them as a mand or a tact.
As such, these two terms then come to stand for the actual
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responses that are made when Skinner uses them to describe verbal behavior. One will of course remember Skinner's original
objections to the use of metaphor or metonymy in literary study
of human verbal behavior. But it is also this metonymical process
that allows Skinner to create his structures of verbal behavior.
To go back to the ideas behind the rhetoric of inquiry,
Skinner demonstrates much of what this direction of inquiry
describes in his «scientific" and «objective" study of verbal behavior. Skinner's Verbal Behavior, while an analysis of verbal behavior and its processes, is also a continuing argument for the use of
scientific methods to investigate language and verbal behavior
over the literary approach which Skinner hopes to supplant. This
argument runs the entire length of Skinner's text, making Verbal
Behavior as much a persuasive and argumentative text as it is an
analysis of language. In his adoption of science as an approach to
the study of verbal behavior, Skinner uses the physical sciences
such as chemistry and physics as a metaphor for what he thinks
of when he calls something «science." Skinner then applies this
metaphor of the physical sciences to depict the very processes of
verbal behavior that he is investigating. Thus the mand and tact
processes become chemical reactions in the same way that they
are verbal interactions. This structure that Skinner creates is, as
Nietzsche pointed out long before, an arbitrary one in that language and verbal behavior do not necessarily behave in the way
Skinner asserts that they do. But Skinner, in the application and
use of his structure, eventually forgets its created aspect, and
deals with the processes he has created as actual behaviors or patterns occurring in language. Finally, Skinner's structure of the
verbal community, and even his mand-tact-autoclitic structure
of language, is based on an essentially metonymical relationship.
Skinner describes the verbal community as reinforcing the verbal behavior of a person, when indeed it is the specific members
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of an audience associated with that verbal community that will
reinforce or punish certain types of verbal behavior. The verbal
community may come to accept such behavior in general, but
this acceptance is through the reinforcement or punishment
given by aspecific audience drawn from that verbal community,
not the community itselE His three-part structure is also based
on a somewhat metonymical relationship, as these processes,
especially the mand and th~ tact, are defined by the consequences or patterns of behaviors that normally accompany the
verbal behavior in question. And this metonymical aspect is
what allows Skinner to create the mand and the tact and use
them in his structure of verbal behavior.
Clearly there is as much to say about what Skinner says as
there is about how he says it. While he rejects the methods used
by the literary, rhetorical, and other approaches to studying verbal behavior, he also demonstrates what could .only be called literary or rhetorical methods in his own "scientific" and "objective" study of language and verbal behavior. This is not to say
that Skinner is wrong because he uses argument, metaphor,
metonymy, etc. The use Qf rhetorical and persuasive techniques
does not invalidate what Skinner has to say about language and
verbal behavior. But it is useful to point out his use of these literary and rhetorical methods, as his attempt in Verbal Behavior
to make the study of behavior a science is described by Skinner
as an effort to eliminate these methods. But clearly Skinner has
not completely eliminated argument, rhetoric, and metaphor
from his study. As this discussion of Skinnees work has demonstrated, these rhetorical and persuasive ways are tied into his "scientific" investigation of language and verbal behavior, and in
many ways, it is these very methods that allow Skinner to create
and describe his conception of verbal behavior, even as he claims
to be eliminating and avoiding the use of these techniques.
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